Introduction by Oaklandsocialist: We were at the May Day rally in Berlin. (Video and photos coming.) We talked with a number of groups there, all of whom defended Putin’s invasion of Ukraine on the grounds that he had to order it because of the supposed threat posed by NATO. We met one young Ukrainian woman, a socialist who was carrying a Ukrainian flag while wearing a kaffiyeh. She told us that this is absolutely common in Germany (as it is in the U.S,). Those on the left who apologize for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine often talk about how NATO expanded into Eastern Europe, in particular the Baltic states. They forget that it

Chechen city of Grozny, destroyed by Russian imperialism, just as Russian imperialism is trying to destroy Ukraine today

was those states that asked to join NATO, the most recent ones having been Finland and Sweden. The reason is that Russia posed and still poses a very real threat to them. After all, before Russia invaded Ukraine, they had already invaded Moldova (1990) Chechnya (1994 and again in 1996),and  Georgia (2008). In any case, what does any supposed threat to Russia have to do with their raining down bombs on Ukrainian civilians? Here, Ukrainian student Hanna Perekhoda discusses the very real threat Russia poses to the Baltic states.

By Hanna Perekhoda

One of the most common reactions to my articles—both from Russian and from European comrades—has, to my surprise, been the following: “A Russian invasion of the EU isn’t remotely realistic. Attack NATO? Absurd. The Baltic states are NATO members, and striking them would plunge Russia into war with half the planet—three nuclear powers among them. Russia hasn’t managed to conquer Donetsk Oblast in three years, what chance does it have against Europe?”

Well, no one is claiming that Russian tank columns will attempt to roll into Berlin tomorrow. The real danger lies elsewhere: Moscow’s capacity and willingness to probe for vulnerabilities, to destabilize, to test the Europe’s resolve. Picture a provocation in one of the Baltic states borders—a “hybrid operation”, a limited action aimed at measuring the response. What exactly constitutes an invasion? This is always a matter of Interpretation! And in this context the argument that NATO is an automatic guarantee looks, at the very least, peculiar. It is an utterly depoliticized view of military affairs. If the largest member decides collective defence is optional—and Donald Trump has said as much, repeatedly—NATO’s deterrence vanishes the moment its credibility does.

There is no shortage of warning flares. Just last week, RAF Typhoon fighters were scrambled twice from Malbork Air Base in Poland: on 15 April 2025 to shadow a Russian Il‑20M reconnaissance plane over the Baltic Sea, and again on 17 April to intercept an unidentified aircraft leaving Kaliningrad airspace. Such interceptions have become routine, a reminder that Russia is constantly testing the seams of NATO’s eastern flank.

The retort ‘Russia can’t even take the Donbas’ is a category error. Ukraine has been at war since 2014, has received aid from multiple countries, mobilised its entire society, and bears a long history of antagonism with Russia. For many Ukrainians this war is existential. Even so, Moscow is inching forward, expanding production, adapting. Europe, by contrast, is not mobilised—morally, politically, or organisationally. The issue is less armaments than readiness and political culture. And frankly, why should anyone fight for Tallinn? With apologies to Estonian friends, I suspect we will soon hear that question from Western Europeans.

The weaker Europe appears and the more erratic America behaves, the greater the temptation for Putin to test NATO along its eastern edge—territory he believes the West neither needs nor truly values. He does not need to march on Berlin or Paris, his goal is to fracture the ‘collective West.’ He says so openly.

To underestimate this threat, or fail to grasp its nature, is not merely foolish—it is a folly with far‑reaching consequences.

Hanna Perekhoda is a native of Donetsk and a student at the University of Lausanne.

For further reading, see our article on why it’s important to  support Palestine and Ukraine, among other issues, in building an opposition to Trump: Opposing Trump: It’s more complex than it might appear.